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Abstract

In a mobile environment, a number of users act as a network nodes and communicate with one
another to acquire location based information and services. This emerging paradigm has opened up
new business opportunities and enables numerous applications such as road safety enhancement, service
recommendations and mobile entertainment. A fundamental issue that impacts the success of these
applications is the security and privacy concerns raised regarding the mobile users. In that, a malicious
user or service provider can track the locations of a user traveled so that other malicious act can be carried
out more effectively against the user. Therefore, the challenge becomes how to authenticate mobile users
while preserving their actual identity and location privacy. In this work, we propose a novel randomized
or privacy-preserving authentication protocol based on homomorphic encryption. The protocol allows
individual users to self generate any number of authenticated identities to achieve full anonymity in mobile
environment. The proposed protocol prevents users being tracked by any single party including peer
users, service providers, authentication servers, and other infrastructure. Meanwhile, our protocol also
provides traceability in case of any dispute. We have conducted experimental study which demonstrates
the efficiency of our protocol. Another advantage of the proposed protocol is lightweight computation
and storage requirement, particularly suitable for any mobile devices with limited computation power
and storage space.
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Introduction

Due to a wide spread use of mobile devices, a user can access various location based services or communicate
with peer users (within certain proximity) almost everywhere he or she goes, through dynamically and temporarily formed networks such as mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) and vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET).
Considering the large number of mobile users, these ad-hoc networks open up tremendous business opportunities, and numerous mobile applications have been proposed ranging from location-based recommendation
services, driving safety enhancement [7, 14], dynamic route planning [24] to mobile entertainment [39]. For
example, a user may send inquiries to other users around certain landmarks to obtain the up-to-date congestion information, the condition of a road or parking information. Users can exchange files or chat with
others in a newly established social network.
One of the key component towards the successful roll-out of mobile or location based applications is to
provide security and privacy guarantees. Without proper security and privacy guarantees, the rich functionality and services provided by mobile ad-hoc networks can be abused, jeopardizing the safety of users, as
well as the performance of the entire network. For example, a malicious user can claim a fake traffic jam to
gain the right of the road and cause other vehicles to make an unnecessary detour. The user can also send

1

unfounded negative comments regarding a local business to other users within the same mobile network.
As a result, users should be authenticated before they are allowed to access services offered through these
dynamically formed mobile networks.
Since a user’s location can reveal the actual identity of the user, it is in the best interest of the user
not to be tracked by service providers or peer users. In many non critical scenarios, a service provider may
only need to know whether the user is authenticated or not, but does not need to know the user’s actual
identity. Thus, users’ privacy should be preserved during authentication in that their identities should be
kept private in order to avoid unlawful tracing and user profiling. More specifically, these parties may cause
privacy concerns: (i) the authentication server or service provider; (ii) peer users. The server may obtain the
behavior pattern or track the user locations according to the record of the users requesting for authentication.
Similarly, other peer users may also be able to track one another through the authentication records. We
refer to the privacy concern caused by the server as the server-wise privacy and the privacy concern caused
by peer users as the peer-wise privacy. Ideally, we should preserve both server-wise and peer-wise privacy for
each mobile user. On the other hand, we should also ensure traceability whereby law enforcement authorities
can reveal a user’s real identity required when disputes occur.
Efforts have been made on developing privacy-preserving authentication protocols in both MANET and
VANET. These existing protocols typically employ one of the following two strategies. One strategy is
to equip users with a large number of authenticated pseudonyms [26, 30]. Then, users use authenticated
pseudonyms to communicate in these ad-hoc networks so that their real identities are hidden from peer users.
In most of such approaches, there are two major limitations. First, the server which produces the pseudonyms
can track the users. Second, the revocation of the long list of pseudonyms of a malicious user is very costly.
The other existing common strategy is to hide a user in a group of users (like in VANET [23, 31, 42]). Under
this type of protocols, users can prove that they are valid group members without revealing real identities to
other users in the same group. However, the users can still be tracked by their group manager. It is also not
reasonable to assume a group is trustworthy without providing any evidence. How to establish such trust is
still an open problem.
In [3, 4], an anonymous credential system that use zero-knowledge proof was proposed to achieve anonymous authentication. Being the best among the exiting work, this scheme achieves several of our proposed
goals under privacy-preserving user authentication, but comparing to the proposed solution, the scheme is
not very efficient and it is only statistically secure. We will adopt this scheme as a baseline to demonstrate
the advantages of our proposed protocol.

1.1

Our Contribution

To overcome the shortcomings in existing work, we propose a novel randomized / privacy-preserving authentication protocol (namely RAU) that truly preserves users’ privacy while still ensure traceability. The
proposed protocol is designed based on Homomorphic encryption [25] and it allows each user to self generate any number of authenticated identities to prove his or her legal status when communicating with peer
users, service providers, or other infrastructure (like road-side units in VANET). In fact, users will be able
to easily use a new identity for each newly established communication. These randomized identities can
be verified through the collaboration of a pair of authentication servers while each authentication server
would not know the real identity of the authentication requester. In this way, we achieve both peer-wise
and server-wise privacy preservation. For traceability, the pair of authentication servers need to execute a
collaborative protocol so that the real identity of the malicious user can be identified. We summarize the
advantages of our proposed authentication protocol as follows.
• Under our authentication protocol, users’ real identities are hidden from each individual party including
authentication servers, peer users, service providers, and other infrastructure.
• Our protocol achieves a set of desired security and privacy properties such as unforgeability, unlinkability and traceability. It is robust against various types of attacks (as discussed later in Section
5).
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• Our approach no longer has the key revocation problem neither the costly group management. Specifically, users using the proposed protocol no longer need to preload a huge number of keys (i.e.,
pseudonyms) or rely on others (i.e., peers or infrastructure) to generate the pseudonyms. Our experimental study demonstrates the proposed protocol is very efficiency.
• Our protocol does not require users to be equipped with high performance computing equipment since
almost all computations are outsourced to the servers and the users only need to generate several
encryptions and random numbers.
• User authentication is very efficient in our protocol well under the 100ms requirement [20]. Since
anonymity revocation needs not to be done as a real-time application (due to court orders), our
protocol provides reasonable computation time (as presented in Section 6).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related works. Section 3 introduces
some preliminary notions of encryption adopted in this work. Section 4 presents the proposed randomized
authentication protocol. Section 5 discusses the possible attacks and the security and privacy properties of
the protocol. Then, Section 6 reports the experimental results. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and
outlines future research directions.

2

Related Work

Dynamically and temporarily formed mobile network can classified into two common categories: mobile
ad-hoc network (MANET) and vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET). We can consider VANET as a domain
specific example of MANET. In this paper, we do not distinguish between the two types of mobile networks
since user privacy issues are common for both networks and our proposed authentication protocol works for
cases. On the other hand, to present the related work, we separate the two networks.

2.1

Privacy-Preserving Authentications
in VANET

We can categorize the existing work on privacy-preserving authentication in VANET into two major categories: (i) pseudonym-based and (ii) group-based protocols.
The general goal of the pseudonym-based authentication protocols is to enable vehicles to use different
pseudonyms during communication rather than using their real identities. One of the earliest work in this
category is by Raya and Hubaux [26]. They suggested that when a vehicle needs to sign a message, it
randomly selects a private key from a huge pool of certificates issued by the authority. The message receiver
will verify the sender’s signature by checking the validity of the corresponding public key certificate. The
problem of this protocol is that vehicles need to check a long list of revoked certificates when verifying each
received signed-message, which is very time consuming.
Raya, et al. in [27] proposed efficient revocation schemes. However, these schemes violate the location
privacy requirement and are subject to a movement tracking attack [34]. In order to reduce the average
overhead of message authentication, Calandriello et al. [2] proposed a hybrid scheme, which is also computationally expensive because it needs to check if the group signature is from a revoked vehicle [35]. Other
pseudonym-based protocols can be found in [13, 30, 32, 33, 41–43], achieving different degrees of improvement
over the key revocation problem. However, in most these protocols, the identity management authority is
required to maintain the certificates associated with each vehicle so as to retrieve the vehicles’ real identities
when disputes occurs. This allows the authority to track the vehicles’ movement; hence, the vehicles’ privacy
is not fully preserved.
Another category of privacy preserving authentication protocols is group-based [6, 12, 16, 19, 22, 23, 29, 31,
36,37,40,42]. The typical idea is to utilize group managers to group and authenticate vehicles, which enables
vehicles to anonymously communicate with group members. In general, existing group-based protocols may
have certain disadvantages: First, the group manager has all the knowledge about group members and
3

hence is able to track them. In our protocol, this becomes harder since the servers in our scheme needs to
collude. Secondly, group managers are difficult to select because they serve as trusted parties. There are no
theoretical results or comprehensive empirical studies on how to select a trustworthy group leader in VANET.
In addition, Groups are also dynamic, and group managers can leave the group at any moment. New group
leaders will know the private information within the group. The more dynamic the group becomes, the more
private information can be leaked from the group. Therefore, we do not adopt grouped based approach in
this paper.

2.2

Privacy-Preserving Authentications
in MANET

Most related work in MANET is associated with authenticating the messages exchanged in the network
without disclosing the actual identities of the source and the destination. Ciszkowski and Koutulski [9]
provided an ANAP protocol which identifies the destination using the hash value of a user’s pseudonymous.
However, the problem of this scheme is how the source of a transmission can get the pseudonymous of
the destination node. By assuming that such pseudonymous are public, attackers can pre-compute a table
containing pairs of pseudonymous-hashes. In this way, when a packet is captured in the network, a destination
node can be immediately discovered. On the other hand, when the pseudonymous is secret, then using hashes
does not provide enough strong security [17].
Chou et al. [8] proposed an efficient anonymous communication protocol for peer-to-peer applications
over MANETs which uses broadcast-based scheme and probability flooding control to establish multiple
anonymous paths within a single query phase. The scheme uses controlled and probabilistic broadcasting to
provide anonymity while avoids using step-by-step encryption/decryption and achieves lower computational
complexity; however, this approach does not work for privacy-preserving user authentication.
Freudiger et al. [11] pointed out a self-organized anonymous message authentication protocol that a user
can use a group of identities including his own to generate a ring signature and the successful verification
reveals the only fact that the signature is generated by one of the group identities to authenticate the messages
sent from a particular group. Similarly, Ren and Harn [28] proposed a (t, n)-threshold ring signature scheme
to achieve anonymous authentication for communication by verifying the ring signature. As other privacypreserving message authentication protocols, the above schemes cannot be used to anonymously authenticate
the identity of a user.
Tsai et al. [38] proposes a secure anonymous authentication protocol to achieve user unlinkability under
mobile wireless environment. In the authentication phase, after receiving the credential (certificate) from
user, FA (Foreign Agent) forwards the credential with his signature to HA (Home Agent) who issued credentials to users in the initial phase. HA will check the validity of the credential by searching the mapping
table and send back the acknowledgement message when the credential is correct. However, in such scheme,
the HA can learn useful information to track a user when the FA sends authenticating information to him.
Kotzanikolaou et al. [21] presented an efficient anonymous authentication scheme that provides untraceability and unlinkability of mobile devices while accessing location-based services. The scheme using standard primitives such as zero-knowledge proofs, MACs and challenge/response. However, there are a couple
of drawbacks: First, when a user U generates n different credentials, if each user possesses the same n, which
would cause information leakage. If each user possesses different n, they could be tracked by an issuer or SP
(Service Provider) in the verification process. Secondly, If more service providers join the network, not only
more storage space and secret keys shared between the issuer and each service provider are needed, but also
the number of communication messages increase exponentially. Thus, the scheme is not practical.
Camenisch et al. [3,4] introduced an anonymous credential system using zero-knowledge proof to achieve
anonymous authentication. This scheme guarantees user anonymity but has a credential sharing problem
where dishonest users can share their credentials with others. To solve such problem, Cesena et al. [5] stated
a solution based on a hardware security module to prevent credential sharing. The security guarantee and
functionality of Camenisch scheme match our requirement, so this scheme will be used as the baseline to
evaluate the advantages of our proposed randomized authentication (RAU) protocol. Although the RAU
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protocol has the same credential sharing problem, Cesena’s work can be directly applied in our scheme. As
a result, solving the credential sharing problem is not the focal point of our work.
There are other content-based authentication schemes utilize attribute encryption. For instance, Baden et
al. [1] developed Persona which achieves privacy by encrypting private content and prevents misuse of a user’s
data through authentication under online social network. However, when a user authenticates another user or
a group, the users and group need to belong to a certain category, such as “family”, “friend”, and the group
size needs to be almost fixed. Attribute encryption is very expensive when there is a large number of users. In
a dynamic mobile network such as MANET and VANET, both information and users constantly change, it is
impractical or even impossible to apply attribute encryption in this problem domain. In addition, messages
associated with location based services like providing traffic flow information are generally not confidential,
so to save computation and storage costs, we should not encrypt these information under most situations.

3

Preliminary

For better understanding, we present a brief review of the cryptographic notions that are relevant to the
construction of our authentication protocol.

3.1

Homomorphic Encryption

An additive homomorphic probabilistic public key encryption (HEnc+ ) system is used as the building block
in the proposed authentication protocol. Let Epk and Dsk be the encryption and decryption functions in
an HEnc+ system with public key pk and secret key sk. Without sk, no one can discover x from Epk (x) in
polynomial time. When the context is clear, we will omit pk and sk from the notations of the encryption
and decryption functions. The HEnc+ system has the following properties:
• The encryption function is additive homomorphic in that the product of the encryptions of x1 and x2
produces the encryption of x1 + x2 .
E(x1 ) ∗ E(x2 ) = E(x1 + x2 )

(1)

E(x)c = E(c ∗ x)

(2)

• Given a constant c and E(x):
• The encryption function has semantic security as defined in [15], i.e., a set of ciphertexts do not
provide additional information about the plain-text to an adversary. E.g., suppose that y1 and y2 are
the ciphertexts generated by performing the encryptions of x at different times using the same key,
there is very high probability that y1 6= y2 , but D(y1 ) = D(y2 ) holds.
Any HEnc+ system is applicable, but in this paper, we adopt Paillier’s public-key homomorphic encryption
system [25] for the actual implementation due to its efficiency, particularly when the plain-text values are
small. In a simplified version of Paillier, the public key is N = p ∗ q, where p and q are large primes with
similar size, and they are private information. In general, the size of N should be at least 1,024 bits. The
encryption function is defined as follows for x:
E(x, r) = (N + 1)x ∗ rN

mod N 2

where r is randomly chosen from Z∗N 2 . Note that the encryption function is only based on the public key,
and the group Z∗N 2 contains the elements from ZN 2 = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N 2 − 1} which are co-prime to N 2 . Since
r is randomly selected each time a value is encrypted, E(x, r1 ) 6= E(x, r2 ) if r1 6= r2 . On the other hand,
D(E(x, r1 )) = D(E(x, r2 )) = x regardless the value of r1 and r2 .
In this paper, we will also use Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [10] to generate a random number
shared by two parties or entities.
5

Figure 1: An Overview of the Data Flow
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RAU: The Proposed Randomized Authentication Protocol

In this section, we present the proposed privacy-preserving authentication protocol. We first discuss the
system setup and give an overview of the protocol. Then we elaborate on the details in each phase of the
authentication.

4.1

An Overview of the Protocol

The proposed authentication system consists of two kinds of entities: authentication servers and mobile
users. In the basic version, the system has two authentication servers, namely Registration Server (RS),
and Verification Server (VS). The two servers collaborate with each other to conduct authentication for
vehicle users, and hence none of them is able to track the user alone. In addition, we assume that vehicles
can communicate with remote authentication servers via the Internet, following the assumptions adopted in
previous works [29]. When designing the protocol, we aim to achieve the following security requirements:
• Authenticating message senders: We should verify that the message sender is a legitimate user in the
network.
• Preserving user anonymity: The real identity of the message senders should not be known by peer
users. Further, entities (e.g., peer users or an authentication server) should not be able to track a
user’s behavior in that they should not be able to link multiple messages to the same sender.
• Providing traceability: If necessary, the two authentication servers will be able to collaboratively
retrieve a user’s real identity.
The proposed authentication protocol has three main phases: (1) user registration, (2) user authentication, and (3) identity tracing. Figure 1 illustrates an overview of the data flow in the system. At the
beginning, users register at the RS server. The RS server shares part of the information of users’ pseudo
identities with the VS server. Whenever users want to communicate with others, they can randomly generate
pseudo identities which can be verified by the VS server. If there is any dispute, the two servers will conduct
a tracing protocol to figure out the real identity of the suspect vehicle. The detailed steps in each phase will
be presented in the following subsections. For clarity, Table 1 lists the frequently used notions in this paper.

4.2

User Registration

To begin with, the RS server generates its own public-private key pair using the Paillier encryption scheme,
and the public key is known by any user who logs onto an ad-hoc network. Users will always communicate
with the servers through a secure channel. Specifically, a session key between a user u and a server can
6

Table 1: List of Notations
Notation
RAU
RS
VS
E(x,r)
D(y)
IDu
RIDu
τu
γu
rui

Meaning
Randomized Authentication
Registration Server
Verification Server
Encrypt x using RS’ public key
Decrypt the ciphertext y
Real identity of user u
Randomized identity of user u
Randomization interval of user u
Randomization seed of user u
Random number generated at ith round

be generated using any well-known method, e.g., Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. The remaining
communication between the server and the user will be encrypted using the session key only known to them.
Similarly, the communication between the two authentication servers is also via a secure channel.
User registration is an on-going process. That is, a new user can join the system at any moment. To
register, a user u sends the real identity (IDu ) such as driver license number1 to the registration server (RS)
via the secure channel. The RS server verifies u’s identity by resorting to a third authority such as DMV
(Department of Motor Vehicles) of the government. Once the identity of u is verified, the RS server computes
an initial randomized authentication ID (RID0u ) for user u as follows:
RID0u = E(IDu , ru0 )

(3)

where E(IDu , ru0 ) is a Paillier encryption of the identity of u with a random number ru0 using the RS’ public
key.
Then, the RS server sends RID0u to both user u and the verification server (VS). Since RID0u is encrypted
using the RS server’s public key, only the RS server is able to decrypt it and reveal the real identity of the
user. The actual identity of the user is always kept secret from the verification server during the lifetime
that the user. After user u is registered, both the RS and VS servers store the user’s initial randomized
authentication ID RID0u in their local databases DBrs and DBvs respectively. The plain texts of the real
identities are discarded by the RS server to prevent attackers from hacking the system and stealing the
sensitive information. The registration protocol is illustrated in Figure 2. Note that all messages are
encrypted using the corresponding session keys between the communicating parties. For clarity, we only
include the content of the messages in the figure.
User

Registration Server

Verification Server

IDu
RID0u

RID0u

Figure 2: User Registration

4.3

User Authentication

Without loss of generality, we present the one-way authentication protocol for user u2 (or a service provider)
to verify if u1 is a legitimate user. To achieve mutual authentication, the process can be executed again
1 Here we use driver license number for illustration only. In practice, we can use more complex information to verify a user’s
identity to prevent an adversary from guessing.
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with u1 and u2 by switching their roles. The authentication protocol consists of three phases: (i) identity
validation, (i) ownership validation, and (iii) generation of randomized authentication ID.
4.3.1

Identity Validation

Suppose u1 uses his or her randomized authentication ID RIDiu1 to initiate the identify validation process
with user u2 . First, u1 executes the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol with u2 to mutually generate a
random number ku1 u2 . The protocol guarantees that the probability of other two users obtaining the same
random number ku1 u2 is close to zero as long as one of the users follows the protocol. In other words, ku1 u2
is unique for each pair of user each time they execute the protocol. The use of this random number is to
prevent the man-in-the-middle attack (discussed in Section 5).
Before sending RIDiu1 to user u2 , u1 will first register a pending authentication request at the VS server
by sending the message: pu1 = [RIDiu1 , ku1 u2 ]. The VS server will searches its database to look for RIDiu1 . If
RIDiu1 exists, the VS server will record this pending request. If not, the VS server will deny the authentication
request. Upon receiving the acknowledgment of successful registration of authentication request from the
VS server, u1 sends RIDiu1 to u2 .
In addition, u1 can also start concurrent authentication sessions with other users at this moment. For
example, suppose u1 wants to contact with three other users (e.g., u3 , u4 and u5 ), u1 can ask RS to generate
three new randomized authentication IDs (see Section 4.3.3 for technical details), and start three additional
sessions with VS as stated above, and continues with the following steps with each user. Here we use u2
to illustrate these steps. For u2 to verify the received RIDiu1 , user u2 forwards this randomized ID together
with the random number ku1 u2 to the VS server. If the VS server finds a pending authentication request
that matches the message sent by u2 , the VS server will inform u2 that this is a valid ID. Otherwise, the VS
server will inform u2 that authentication fails.
u1

u2

Verification Server

ku1 u2
RIDiu1 , ku1 u2
Acknowledgement

RIDiu1
RIDiu1 , ku1 u2
RIDiu1 valid/not valid

Figure 3: Identity Validation

4.3.2

Ownership Validation

Once user u2 confirms the validity of RIDiu1 , user u2 may need to further verify whether user u1 is the real
owner of this ID. If RIDiu1 is currently stored at VS (i.e., has yet to be used by u1 ), this step prevents an
adversary to use RIDiu1 to authenticate his or herself with other users. For instance, an attacker may hack
into the server’s system or the user’s device to obtain a copy of the current randomized IDs of some users,
not the private key which is assumed to be securely stored. Unless the malicious user continuously monitors
or fully controls the server’s system which is usually very difficult not to be detected by the server, he/she
would not be able to impersonate other users using the obtained one-time randomized IDs because he/she
cannot successfully pass the following ownership validation step. Note that this step is optional and not
necessary if the user and the servers’ systems are reasonably secure.
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First, user u2 selects two random values c and r, and sends the following value v1 to u1 .
c
v1 = RIDiu1 ∗ E(0, r)

(4)

where c is a challenging value for u1 to discover, and r can be any random number just for performing
c
the encryption of 0. The purpose of multiplying with E(0, r) is to randomize RIDiu1 , so that it is

c
computationally infeasible for an adversary to compute the discrete log of RIDiu1 to obtain c. Only
if user u1 is the real identity owner, u1 will be able to compute the encrypted value of the challenging
value c. Specifically, u1 first encrypts the multiplicative inverse of his or her real identity ID−1
u1 . Then, u1
ID−1

computes a value v2 by v1 u1 . According to the properties of homomorphic encryption, value v2 is equal to
the encrypted value of c as deduced as follows:
v2

ID−1

= v1 u1

ID−1
c
u1
=
RIDiu1 ∗ E(0, r)
′
= E(c ∗ IDu1 ∗ ID−1
u1 , r )

= E(c, r′ )
Then, user u1 sends v2 to VS who asks the RS server to decrypt v2 = E(c, r′ ) and obtain an decrypted
value D(E(c, r′ )). This E(c, r′ ) does not contain any identity information about user u1 , and hence the RS
server does not know whose identity that u2 is trying to verify. Upon receiving the decrypted value from
RS, VS sends the value to u2 . Then u2 checks if D(E(c, r′ )) equals to c. If yes, user u2 knows that u1 is
the real owner of the identity and informs the VS the authentication succeeded. Figure 4.3.2 depicts the
main messages exchanged during this validation phase. For the above scheme to work, IDu1 needs to have
a multiplicative inverse in ZN . Since N = pq, and p and q are very large prime numbers, this requirement
can be easily satisfied.
u1

VS

u2
c
RIDiu1

RS

∗ E(0, r)

E(c, r′ )
E(c, r′ )
D(E(c, r′ ))
D(E(c, r ))
′

Figure 4: Ownership Validation

4.3.3

Generation of Randomized Authentication ID

In our system, each randomized authentication ID is only used once so that users’ behavior will not be
tracked by any party. When user u1 after communicates with user u2 , user u1 needs to acquire a new
randomized authentication identity RIDiu1 from the RS server. After u1 informs RS its intention to obtain
a new randomized ID, the RS server can produce one based on the last ID associated with u1 according to
Equation 5.
(5)
∗ E(0, rui 1 )
RIDiu1 = RIDui−1
1
The rui 1 value is randomly generated for this ith request from ui . Based on the addition property of the
homomorphic encryption (Equation 1), the new randomized ID is again the encryption of the real identity
which can be deduced as:
RIDiu1 = E(IDu1 , rui−1
) ∗ E(0, rui 1 ) = E(IDu1 + 0, r′ )
1
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It is worth mentioning that by leveraging this addition property, the generation of new randomized ID using
the above Equation is more efficient and secure than directly encrypting the real identity again since there
is no need for the RS server to keep the real identity after the registration phase. This is why the RS server
should delete a user’s real identity for added security protection.
The RS server sends the newly generated randomized ID to both u1 and VS. When the VS server received
the new copy of randomized IDs, it would not be able to link each new ID to its previous version. It is
important to note that the main purpose of generating a new set of randomized authentication IDs is to
prevent VS from tracking the number of times a user has been authenticated. Through a set of randomized
IDs, it is not clear if VS can discover anything related an actual user. Therefore, except for the initial user
registration, periodically generating randomized authentication IDs may not be necessary. We provide such
an option in case the users are exceedingly concerned about their privacy.

4.4

Identity Tracing

In some applications, disputes may occur due to various reasons. Sometimes a third-party law enforcement
authority may want to know immediately the real identity of a suspect user who is undergoing an authentication. Sometimes there may be a need to discover the authentication history of a suspect user. Thus, we
propose both real-time identity tracing and historical identity tracing.
The real-time identity tracing is easy to achieve. The law enforcement authority submits the tracing
request that contains the suspect user’s randomized authentication ID to either the VS server or the RS
server. If the request is received by the VS server. The VS server will forward the suspect user’s randomized
ID to the RS server. Upon receiving the suspect user’s randomized ID, the RS server uses its private key to
decrypt the randomized ID and reports the real identity to the law enforcement authority.
In terms of historical identity tracing, the law enforcement authority captured one randomized ID of the
suspect user and wants to know the authentication history of the user to figure out the user’s behavior in
the network. The law enforcement authority sends the randomized ID of the suspect user to both RS and
VS server. The RS server maintains a list of authentication history of all users. For example, each user has a
list of randomized authentication IDs that have been or are planning to be used. The VS servers maintains
all valid authentication IDs and their targeted service providers or peer users like u2 in our example.
First, the RS server find a match in a user’s list. If there is a match, the list of randomized IDs will be
provided to the law enforcement authority who will subsequently send these IDs to VS. The VS will return
the authority the service providers who have provided services to the user with these randomized ID. Based
on the location of the service providers, the authority may learn where the suspect has been before. To
provide this kind of historical tracing, the only thing needs to be changed is that the RS and VS servers need
more memory space to store previously used randomized IDs. In addition, when the VS server performs
identity validation, it needs to make sure, old IDs cannot be used again. These modifications can be easily
incorporated into our current scheme.
Finally, we would like to mention that the identity revocation is very efficient in our system. Once
a suspect user is confirmed to be malicious, the RS and the VS server just need to remove this user’s
randomization ID from their database. Any subsequent authentication request for this malicious user will
fail as no matching record will be found by the server any more.

5

Threat Models and Analysis

To analyze if a protocol is secure, first we need to be clear the threat or adversary models considered in our
problem domain. Like all existing work discussed in Section 2, we assume the authentication servers: RS
and VS are semi-honest. That is both RS and VS follow the prescribed procedures of the proposed protocol.
This is a legitimate assumption if RS and VS are well-known IT companies. On the other hand, the mobile
users or service providers can be malicious. That is they can do whatever they can to discover the real
identity of a user.
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In this section, we analyze the properties of our proposed authentication protocol and discuss its robustness against various types of attacks according to the above assumptions regarding the adversarial behaviors.
The proposed authentication protocols have the following three properties: (i) unforgeability, (ii) full privacy
preservation, and (iii) traceability.

5.1

Unforgeability

Our authentication protocol guarantees that no one can use the identity that does not belong to him/her.
Under the assumptions that the private key is kept securely at the RS server side, the only option left for
the attacker to impersonate legitimate users is to exploit their randomized authentication IDs. There are
several possible ways for an attacker to obtain a randomized authentication ID of a user. However, we show
in the following that the attacker would not be able to use this ID as its own for authentication purpose.
An attacker can obtain another user’s valid authentication ID during authentication. However, the
attacker cannot directly use the received authentication ID again since each ID is allowed to be used only
once and is discarded after the use by the VS server. If the attacker tries to re-randomize the received ID
using a new random number, the resulting ID will not match any valid authentication ID stored in the VS
server. This is because the attacker does not know the randomization seed used by the real owner of the ID,
and hence the attacker would not be able to generate the same series of randomized IDs that match the real
ones.
Previous discussion is focused on the used randomized IDs. We now discuss the case when the attacker
steal the new randomized IDs from the user, the VS or RS server. Since these IDs have not been used by
the real owner, the attacker will be able to go through the user authentication phase, but will be caught
at the ownership validation phase. This is because the attacker does not know the real identity of the ID
owner, and hence the attacker cannot discover the random number included in the challenging question (as
discussed in Section 4.3.2).
Alternatively, an attacker may try to perform the man-in-the-middle attack. As illustrated in Figure
5.1, the attacker um attempts to forward legitimate user u1 ’s authentication ID to another legitimate user
u2 , and vice versa. The attacker aims to prove to u1 that he is user u2 , and prove to u2 that he is user
u1 . However, such attack will not succeed because our protocol verifies a mutually agreed random number
between each pair of users and this random number is unique for each pair of users at each round of
generation. Recall that at the beginning of the user authentication (Section 4.3.1), user u1 and the attacker
generates a mutually agreed random number (ku1 um ). User u1 registered this random number at the VS
server along with its authentication ID (RIDiu1 ). For anyone who wish to verify the validity of (RIDiu1 ),
he/she needs to provide the random number (ku1 u2 ) to the VS server to prove that he/she is the person who
u1 is currently communicating with. Therefore, even if the attacker tries to present the obtained (RIDiu1 ) to
u2 , the attacker would not be able to establish a mutually agreed random number with u2 that is the same as
(ku1 u2 ), as long as u2 does not collude with um (this is the general assumption under the man-in-the-middle
attack). Consequently, if u2 presents RIDiu1 and a different random number say kum u2 to the VS server
for verification, the VS server will easily discover the matching IDs but un-matching random numbers and
conclude that there is a man-in-the-middle attack.
u1

um

u2

RIDui 1
RIDui 1
RIDuj 2
RIDuj 2

Figure 5: Man-in-the-middle Attack
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5.2

Full Privacy Preservation

Our authentication protocol provides full privacy preservation in that it guarantees both server-wise and
peer-wise privacy for the users in terms of both anonymity and unlinkability. In particular, a user can
always self-generate a new randomized authentication ID when establishing a new communication session.
Thus, peer users would not know the real identity of others, nor be able to link different communication
sessions to the same user.
As for the VS server, it does not have the key to decrypt the randomized IDs stored in its database,
and hence it does not know the real identity of the user who submits authentication request. As for the RS
server, it does not handle any authentication request that contains randomized IDs during the authentication
phase, and hence the RS server does not know who is sending the authentication request and cannot track
the users.

5.3

Traceability

Traceability refers to the ability to reveal the user’s real identity requested by the law authorities. This is a
seemingly conflicting requirement with respect to the privacy preservation goal of our system. We achieve
this by proposing the collaborative identity tracing protocol as presented in Section 4.4. The identity tracing
protocol is capable of revealing a suspect user’s real identity and his/her whole authentication history to the
law authorities without violating the privacy of other legitimate users.

6

Experimental Study

Please note that our protocol does not require the users be equipped with high performance computing
equipment. The following hardware specification is used to simulate the servers, but not the hardware on
the vehicles. We implemented the RAU authentication protocol in C language with GMP library, and run
the tests on a PC with Intel Xeon CPU X5675 @3.07GHZ x6 and 11.7GB memory. We evaluate the efficiency
of the total authentication process in terms of computational cost. We did not include the transmission and
propagation delay since they are dependent on specific network configuration.

6.1

User Registration

The main computational cost involved in user registration is the generation of the initial randomized ID for
the new user. Each randomized ID is 2048 bits. From the experiments, we observe that the randomized ID
generation time is less than 3ms for each user.

6.2

User Authentication

Recall that the user authentication protocol consists of three phases: identity validation, ownership validation
and randomized ID generation. Please note that not every phase is required for each user authentication.
As discussed in Section 4.3.2, the ownership validation phase is optional. Thus, the efficiency of the identity
validation phase is important. As reported later in this section, all three phase combined take about 7ms. In
addition, the average latency for a 4G network (e.g., Verizon) is 30ms. Therefore, the total cost is well below
the 100ms requirement stated in [20] (for VANET). Identity tracing is very efficient, and it only requires
several encryption operations.
As mentioned in Section 1, the anonymous credential (AC) protocol [3] uses zero-knowledge proof to
achieve privacy-preserving user authentication. Being the best among the exiting solutions, that scheme
achieves most criteria for anonymous authentication defined in this paper. Here we compare its efficiency
with our protocol. In order to have the same security guarantee as our proposed RAU protocol, we need
to include the run time for both credential issuing and verification phases. We implement the AC protocol
under the same computing environment as RAU, and the run time for each protocol is reported in Table
2. According to the table, 7ms include all three phases of RAU. RAU- represents the situation where the
12

Protocol

Run time

RAU
RAUAC

7ms
3ms
40ms

Table 2: RAU vs. AC
ownership validation phase is omitted. As we can see, the proposed protocol is considerably more efficient
than the AC protocol.

7

Conclusion and Future Work

In this paper, we present a randomized authentication protocol for mobile users in both MANET and
VANET. The protocol leverages the properties of an additive homomorphic probabilistic public key encryption system. The proposed protocol overcomes shortcomings in other existing works, and achieves a set of
desired properties including unforgeability, full privacy preservation, identity tracing and fault tolerance. In
particular, it is more efficient and secure than [3]. In the future, we plan to study access control mechanism
in mobile environments that can be integrated into the proposed anonymous authentication system.
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